History without history by Tomlinson, George S.
52 r a d i c a l  p h i l o s o p h y  1 9 9  ( s e p t / o c t  2 0 1 6 )
History without history
Frank Ruda, For Badiou: Idealism without Idealism, Northwestern University Press, Evanston IL, 2015. xxiv + 200 
pp., £32.50 pb., 978 0 8101 3097 5.
As anyone familiar with Alain Badiou’s œuvre knows, 
a central tenet of his system is that there are no such 
things as ‘philosophical events’, ‘philosophical truths’ 
or ‘philosophical subjects’. Philosophy testifies to 
events, truths and subjects – it retroactively declares 
and defends their existence – but it does not produce 
them (this is the exclusive domain of philosophy’s 
‘extra-philosophical’ conditions: love, science, art and 
politics). The ironic thing about Frank Ruda’s For 
Badiou: Idealism without Idealism – a resolutely philo-
sophical book, it is ‘with and for philosophy’ – is that, 
whilst seeking not to violate Badiou’s own axiomatic 
difference between philosophy and its conditions, it 
mimics the formal structure of Badiou’s desired rela-
tion between an event, truth and subject in its account 
of Badiou himself. Whether this is intentional or not 
is unclear, but for Ruda the name ‘Badiou’ undeniably 
functions as a philosophical event that has pierced 
our contemporary situation. This event has bestowed 
a body of philosophical knowledge which, despite 
not possessing the privileged status of a truth (it 
cannot, in so far as knowledge is for Badiou abso-
lutely separate from truth), is presented as eternal 
and exceptional as the truths whence it came. And 
this knowledge demands fidelity on the part of its 
philosophical subject bearers. 
Apart from his final call to question Badiou’s deci-
sion to abandon Hegel, Ruda is militant in his fidelity 
to Badiou. There is barely a modicum of what one 
might identify as ‘critique’ in these pages (incredibly, 
Ruda states that ‘any true pupil of a master can 
only be faithful to him or her by utterly betraying 
him or her at one point’). For all this, the breadth of 
Ruda’s engagement with Badiou is impressive. This 
is a beautifully synthetic book, in many regards an 
exemplar of a close textual reading of a philosopher 
and his interlocutors (in this case Plato, Descartes, 
Hegel, Marx and Žižek). Its methodology reframes 
and extends that of Freud: the tripartite technique 
of ‘remembering, repeating, and working through’ 
is creatively doubled, yielding six chapters that offer 
concise but rigorous explications of, among other 
things, Badiou’s identification of mathematics (set 
theory) with ontology (his identification of being with 
‘the void’), his account of different types of negation 
(Ruda insists that ‘[his] whole œuvre can be read as 
a working through of dialectics’), his reconstruction 
of the finite/infinite relation and his well-known 
rendition of the ‘communist idea’. However, the 
principal issue that underlies this book – the over-
riding framework through which Badiou’s system is 
presented – is in fact quite conventional: the well-
trodden distinction between idealism and material-
ism. Ruda’s response is to insert this distinction into 
materialism itself, and thereby to transcode it into 
Badiou’s distinction, in Logics of Worlds, between 
‘democratic materialism’ and ‘materialist dialectics’. 
Yet the impulse behind this move (one, to be sure, 
that Badiou does not make) is not to jettison ideal-
ism (this would affirm a self-sufficient materialism), 
but to renew it, albeit by ‘subtracting’ (sublating) it 
from the idealism/materialism distinction. This is 
Ruda’s dialectical manoeuvre, one that stems from 
the conviction that contemporary materialism ‘is 
not materialist enough’, that it is precisely ‘the 
empty remainder, the empty place left by idealism 
… which makes materialism properly materialist’. 
What Badiou’s work provides access to is an ‘ideal-
ism without idealism’; a ‘renaissance of idealism’ that 
promises – and this is the real provocation – to make 
Marx’s eleventh thesis on Feuerbach relevant to the 
twenty-first century.
Following Badiou, ‘democratic materialism’ is for 
Ruda the contemporary and thus historical result 
of the ‘death of idealism’ (which is itself the his-
torical result of Cantorian set theory). The scope 
of this concept, in Logics of Worlds and For Badiou 
alike, is expansive, so much so that it is at times 
entirely unspecified, reducing its critical purchase 
to a negative backdrop against which the rebirth of 
materialism – materialist dialectics – is imagined. 
Broadly speaking, it can be grasped as ‘a materialism 
without idea, a materialism without idealism’ whose 
basic axiom is ‘there are only bodies and languages’ 
(occasionally supplemented with ‘there are only indi-
viduals and communities’). In this regard (resonating 
with the late Heidegger), democratic materialism is 
‘a contemporary form of nihilism [that] implies a 
reduction of human being to its own animal sub-
structure’, which is to say that its ‘hegemony’ reduces 
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human life to the level of finite individual bodies 
satisfying their needs through particular languages 
and cultural forms ‘translatable and exchangeable’. 
In Marx’s terms, this is the alienation of the sociality 
of human need. It should come as little surprise that 
democratic materialism is for Ruda the contemporary 
form of ideology, whose political-economic basis is 
what Badiou calls ‘parliamentary-capitalism’. In the 
terms of philosophy’s conditions, to be a democratic 
materialist (one senses that this is the vast major-
ity of humankind today) means: you are scientifi-
cally naive (1, 2, 3, etc. are nothing but finite natural 
numbers); you are politically indecisive (you ‘choose 
without choosing’, because you foreclose the ‘impos-
sible possibility’ of events, rendering your conception 
of freedom ‘pure and simple indifference’); your love 
is largely carnal (you ‘love sex in which one is allowed 
to freely consume the other, to express one’s desires 
in the most direct manner’, but ‘feel threatened by 
love’); and you are artistically poor (one thinks of 
Max Tomba’s ‘advertising is our contemporary poetry, 
speaking directly to the most intimate of our desires’).
In so far as it naturalizes the given, democratic 
materialism ‘forcefully forgets, denies, represses, and 
obliviates the very existence of dialectics and thereby 
consequently enforces an amnesia of the idea’. This is 
the crux of Ruda’s critique of democratic materialism: 
it violates the indissociable unity of materialism and 
dialectics (significantly, Sartre’s systematic examina-
tion of this in Critique of Dialectical Reason is nowhere 
to be found); hence it resists ‘the very conception of an 
idea’; that is, it only overcame idealism in the first 
place because it disposed of the ‘materialist kernel 
of idealism itself ’ (and thus the idealist kernel of 
materialism itself). In short, it is easy to see how 
‘democratic materialism’ functions as a ready-made 
antithesis to the groundbreaking construction of a 
new materialism, a properly contemporary material-
ism (‘idealism without idealism’). In place of ‘the 
predominance of a very specific, reactionary, and 
obscurantist interpretation of the two’ (‘there are 
only bodies and languages’), we are invited to think 
a ‘dialectics of the exception’ wherein ‘the proper 
two is only graspable from the position of a three’ 
(‘there are only bodies and languages, except that 
there are truths’, or ‘yes, there are only individuals 
and communities, except that there are subjects’). As 
opposed to the democratic materialist regime of the 
possible (a ‘stable … statist regime that although it 
constantly seems to change, never truly changes’), 
materialist dialectics offers ‘something that appears 
to be unthinkable and impossible … a materialism 
of the impossible’. If democratic materialism is ideol-
ogy, materialist dialectics is ‘ideology critique’. And 
whereas democratic materialism feeds on ‘the satura-
tion of the communist hypothesis’ within politics, 
such that its condemnation of communism ‘is a 
condemnation of thought tout court and hence also 
of philosophy’, materialist dialectics summons a phil-
osophy that remembers ‘the necessarily impossible, 
the impossibly necessary’ and so true political action. 
(Badiouian) materialism is the communist idea. 
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Importantly, and unlike his presentation of 
democratic materialism, Ruda builds the concept 
of materialist dialectics through a detailed analysis 
of Badiou’s chosen philosophical partners. As the 
thinker of the idea par excellence, whose writings 
exemplify the unity between the idea and dialectics 
– and thus the fact that ‘the very nature of the idea 
is exceptional’ – Plato illuminates the real material-
ist task of philosophy: ‘meta-critical anamnesis’. By 
‘re-actualizing not only what has been forgotten but 
also … the very means with which this anamnesis 
operates’, philosophy is armed with the capacity to 
project onto the future and repeat the past in one and 
the same moment. A primary target of such anam-
nesis is unavoidably Marx, which means remember-
ing and repeating his complex relation to Hegel and 
hence the idea of ‘true’ (universal) action. Faithful to 
Badiou, Ruda declares that true action ‘upholds the 
permanence of classicism’, which is to say that it ‘is 
the concrete articulation of a constantly perpetuated 
classicism within a world’. True action, in other words, 
re-actualizes the ‘determinate affirmation’ (determi-
nate negation) within dialectics: a political decision 
that corresponds to the classical logic of negation, the 
exclusive ‘yes or no’ (as opposed to the ‘para consistent 
temptation’ of ‘yes and no at the same time’). This 
is the non-dialectical dimension of dialectics, its 
evental dimension. Materialist dialectics is thus ‘a 
dialectics of dialectics and non-dialectics’: it is fidelity to 
the contingent event ‘as that which is not deducible 
from any dialectic whatsoever’ but at the same time 
‘is what it will have been only through the dialecti-
cal unfolding.’ An event cannot be substantialized, 
or ‘there is the dialectical and there will have been 
the non-dialectical prior to the dialectical but only 
accessible after its emergence.’ The influence of Žižek 
is clear: For Badiou matches Less than Nothing in its 
commitment to the logic of retroactivity.
Ruda also looks to Badiou’s reading of Descartes 
to advance his materialism, a Descartes who shows 
that, despite our finitude, ‘we can think that which 
we cannot think … we can conceive of that which is 
but does not exist.’ Descartes’ philosophy is a model 
for thinking the impossible possibility of the emer-
gence of truths. It demonstrates, first, that truths 
are eternal, not because they have existed since time 
immemorial, but because they have been created (they 
are ‘linked to … absolute contingency’); and, second, 
that truths are exceptional – the Cartesian two is 
not originarily internal to the domain of the ‘there 
is’ (it is at first not mind and body), but is rather this 
domain (thinking and extended substance alike) and 
the domain of truths (which, like events, have no 
substance). In this sense, Cartesian dualism is excep-
tional, and at the heart of materialist dialectics. The 
difference between Descartes and Badiou lies in their 
conceptions of the subject: whilst the former locates 
the creation of truths in God’s will – the ‘absolute 
contingency of a free creative will’, in Sartre’s words 
– the latter sees the subject as ‘a fragmentary agent 
of the creation of truths’, a finite subject that is a con-
sequence of the event but also that through which its 
truths are made. In Badiou, subject processes are the 
agents of truth procedures that ‘always … [take] place 
in a singular and historically specific situation’. The 
difference, it would thus seem, between Descartes 
and Badiou is history. If ‘the event creates the God on 
which it will have relied’, Badiou subtracts God from 
the creation of eternal truths and thereby dissociates 
himself (and presumably materialist dialectics) from 
any religious connotations. 
This is important, because it constitutes a poten-
tial rebuttal to accusations of the mystical and 
therefore anti-historical character of Badiou’s phil-
osophy (see, specifically, the reviews of Being and 
Event by Jean-Jacques Lecercle in RP% 93 and Peter 
Osborne in RP %142). Indeed, a feature of For Badiou, 
one that comes out most forcefully in Ruda’s account 
of Badiou’s critique of Hegel, is the historicity already 
generated by Badiou’s system and theoretically 
enriched by Ruda’s concept of materialist dialectics 
(in particular, ‘true multiplicity … for Badiou is the 
prerequisite to truly account for different historical 
situations and transformations occurring in them’). 
Yet for all its invocations of Badiou’s historical bear-
ings, For Badiou reproduces – in fact it exacerbates 
– what is truly an anti-historical philosophy. To put 
this another way, Badiou’s philosophy, and with it 
For Badiou, is resolutely historicist. It systematically 
conflates ‘historical specificity’ with historical think-
ing, which above all proceeds from its association 
of ontology not with history but with set theory 
(which may have a history but, to paraphrase Marx, 
‘naturally does not know history’). In this regard, 
pure multiplicity can only account for historical situ-
ations and transformations because ‘the true primacy 
of the two contains the impossibility of totalization’. 
Whether it is acknowledged or not, there can be no 
thought of ‘history’ absent the concept of totalization 
(Ruda operates with what Sartre would identify as the 
‘vulgar’ concept of totality, one that forgets, denies, 
represses and obliviates the practical identity between 
totalization and dialectics). Pure multi plicity, in other 
words, is historicism run amok. 
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This dovetails with the assertion, as earlier 
mentioned, that materialist dialectics (qua ‘ideal-
ism without idealism’) provides the means for a new 
reading of Marx’s eleventh thesis on Feuerbach, a 
reading that would, contra democratic materialism, 
affirm ‘the existence of a (common) world before 
addressing the question of how to change it’. Behind 
this priority given to affirmation over transformation 
is an opposing vision, between Ruda and Marx, of the 
relationship between materialism, philosophy and 
the world. Whilst Ruda’s materialism seeks a norma-
tive affirmation of the world, whereby philosophy 
is ‘occupied with that which is not … with exceptions 
to what there is’, Marx’s materialism dictates – to 
invoke the well-known maxim from his doctoral 
thesis – that philosophy’s worldly realization is at 
once its loss. This difference brings to centre stage the 
other ironic thing about For Badiou: it presents itself 
within the terms of a thesis that is a critique of the 
self-sufficiency of philosophy. The point here is not 
that Ruda misunderstands Marx, but that Badiou’s 
philosophy is a self-sufficient philosophy; that its 
four conditions do not mitigate but in fact secure this 
self-sufficiency (his philosophy, after all, ‘designates’ 
its own conditions). This does not only cast doubt 
on the notion that Ruda’s materialism fosters a new 
reading of Marx’s eleventh thesis. It also suggests that 
this materialism – and with it Badiou’s philosophy – 
has more in common with analytic philosophy than 
either Ruda or Badiou would likely admit. 
George Tomlinson
Mao for now
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As the preface of this book acknowledges, there is 
now no shortage of interviews with Jacques Rancière. 
Not only is the Internet bulging with them, but just 
three years before this recent book-length inter-
view came out in French, many were collected into 
a volume running to almost 700 pages (an English 
translation is expected in 2017), while another short 
book of interviews appeared last year. If readers of 
Rancière don’t seem to tire of hearing what their 
author has to say about his work, it is partly due to 
the nature of his monographs, which rarely state 
their aims and principles directly, and which can 
often best be characterized as ‘performative’. 
Arguably, Rancière’s thought moves in the present 
tense, constructing the principles it follows in syn-
chrony with the encounters with its objects. These 
principles are then named and defined only retro-
spectively, often following engagement with some of 
his more demanding readers: ‘All of a sudden, they 
ask you to explain your thinking by taking it out of its 
direct relationship with what it’s trying to think, with 
what it’s exerted on.’ Rancière states that he never 
intended to develop a theory of politics or a theory of 
art. If such theories exist, he says, they have emerged 
as a consequence of such retrospective engagements, 
following invitations from different readers. 
It is true that one needs to look beyond these 
‘theories’ in order to get to the core of Rancière’s 
thought, and the virtue of this collection is that 
it aims to do precisely this. Aptly named (by the 
interviewee himself), it focuses on the methodo-
logical principles underlying Rancière’s thought in 
its different subject areas (history, historiography, 
political theory, aesthetics, literature, cinema). Thus, 
Rancière’s main concepts appear less as ground-laying 
than as recapitulations of these principles. A central 
goal of the book, as Jeanpierre and Zabunyan state, 
is to address the danger, often present in the discus-
sions of Rancière’s work, that the more fundamental 
principles disappear behind the routine use of his 
technical terms. 
The book is divided into four parts according 
to a loose classification of the different scopes of 
Rancière’s work. It begins with an overview of the 
development of Rancière’s position in its biographical 
context (‘Geneses’), moving in the second part to 
question permanent currents running through the 
various fields of his work (‘Lines’); the third part turns 
to potential critical points, or internal and external 
limits, of Rancière’s thought (‘Thresholds’), and the 
last part considers the ways in which Rancière’s 
thought engages with the present, in the theoretical 
and historical senses (‘Present tenses’). 
Rancière’s ‘break with Althusser’ has become a 
misleading cliché in the secondary literature; in the 
foreword of this collection Jeanpierre and Zabun-
yan specify that this rupture was a ‘political and 
methodological’ one. However, the emphasis on a 
break risks overlooking the elements from Althusser 
that substantially contributed to Rancière’s method-
ology. Rancière claims, for example, to have ‘been 
more faithful … than Althusser was himself ’ to the 
latter’s theory of multiple temporalities, and several 
